The envisaged EU enlargement will lead to a redirection of Structural and Cohesion Funds expenditures from current to new EUmembers. This redistribution of funds makes the accession countries even more attractive as a location of FDI. Using a logistic regressions approach, this paper shows that a hypothetical reallocation of Structural Funds as envisaged by Agenda 2000 leads to a redistribution of FDI by approximately 0.8 percentage points from the current EU members to the accession countries (first round) and 2.6 percentage points (second round), respectively.
Introduction
The EU Enlargement will lead to a redirection of Structural and Cohesion Funds expenditures from current to future EU member states. According to Agenda 2000, there is a consensus to preserve current overall expenditure levels and to finance the New Structural Operations in the Central and Eastern Economies (CEEC) by a redistribution from current to the new members.
The aim is to promote the catching up process of the new members and to close the -in some of the accession countries considerable -gaps in infrastructure, capital endowments, etc. This redistribution of funds is expected to increase foreign direct investment (FDI) into the accession countries in relative terms at the expense of FDI into the current EU members.
The impact of the reallocation of Structural and Cohesion Funds on the inward FDI position of incumbent EU countries does not only depend on the absolute change in the amount of structural funds, but also on whether they gain or loose relative to the other countries competing for FDI. So, the reallocation of funds will not only affect the absolute level of a countries' inward FDI position, but also its distribution between the incumbent and the entrant countries.
The theory of horizontal MNEs suggests that Structural and Cohesions
Funds expenditures reduce the plant set-up costs and in this way change the proximity-concentration trade-off in favor of MNE activity (Breuss et al., 2001 ). On the other hand, they also improve the infrastructure of a country part of which form its transportation networks. This component reduces transportation costs and favors trade rather than FDI. Hence, the overall impact of the Structural Funds on the allocation of FDI remains an em- Traditional horizontal MNE models (see Markusen et. al., 1996; Markusen and Maskus 1999A and 1999B; Breuss et.al., 2001 ) suggest two important size-related determinants: an increase in both the bilateral market size and the similarity in size fosters bilateral multinational activity. Finally, relative factor endowments are relevant. The sending to receiving country's physical capital to low-skilled labor ratio as well as the high-skilled to low-skilled on the now official enlargement plans. 
A Logistic FDI Gravity Model, the Data Sources and the Estimation Results
According to these theoretical arguments, we can set up a gravity FDI distribution model, which accounts for the impact of structural expenditures on bilateral stocks of outward FDI. 2 We envisage a FDI-sending country i, which allocates its foreign direct investments to j = 1, ..., J current and future European host countries. Hence, we look at a 'typical' OECD country and the allocation of its outward FDI among the EU15 and the CEEC, disregarding other alternative investment possibilities. For reasons of data availability, we take Spain as the base host country, and formulate the following logistic 2 Compare Belderbos (1992) for a similar approach in another context.
where F ijt denotes the log of country i's real stock of outward FDI held in country j in year t. s is the host country's structural expenditure to GDP ratio, G is the log of the bilateral sum of real GDP, S denotes the log of the bilateral similarity index in terms of real GDP with log(0) ≤ S ≤ log(0.5) (compare Helpman, 1987) . k represents the bilateral difference in the logs of the physical capital to low-skilled labor ratio and h is the bilateral difference in the logs of the high-skilled to low-skilled labor ratio.
Transportation costs are approximated by the log of the c.i.f./f.o.b. ratio derived from trade statistics (compare Baier and Bergstrand, 2001) . µ ij and λ t capture all unobserved influences, which are either constant in all years (distance, language, border, etc.) or common to all cross-sections (e.g. common cycle effects). As the other explaining variables, these dummies are also defined relative to the base (Spain). Finally, the remainder error ε is assumed to be i.i.d. normally distributed N (0, σ 2 ).
> Keller, 2000) .
We start the calculation in 1978, i.e., eight years earlier as the first year in the estimation period, to give lower weight to possibly mismeasured initial stock values:
where K t denotes the real capital stock and I t is gross fixed capital formation (OECD, National Accounts). In line with the bulk of the literature, we assume a constant and identical depreciation rate of 7%, so that the real capital stocks in the other years are given by
The difference in the real stock of capital to low-skilled labor ratio (k) uses employment times the share of primary school enrolment (OECD, Education at a Glance) as a proxy of the low-skilled labor force. We measure h by the secondary to primary school enrolment figures' ratio (OECD, Education at a Glance).
The panel covers outward FDI from a large set of OECD countries into the EU15 and the Central and Eastern European countries over the period 1986 to 1997, and it is unbalanced. Altogether, we can exploit information from 960 observations in the regression analysis.
We estimate (1) using the fixed effects AR(1) estimator, since the autocorrelation of the residuals turned out to be substantial (compare the modified Bhargava et al., 1982 , Durbin-Watson statistics in Table 2 ) and AR(1) estimation seems a must. Table 2 presents the results from four estimated models. Models (1) and (3) include both the EU15 members and the CEEC as destinations of OECD outward FDI. Models (2) and (4) exclude the CEECs.
Models (3) and (4) skip excessive outliers by excluding all observations with residuals in the first and last percentile.
> Table 2 <
All four estimated models fit well and the results are fairly robust with respect to both the sample coverage and the correction for outliers. In any model, the estimated coefficient of the structural funds variable is highly significant. To get a quantification of its impact on the FDI shares, we use the simple approximation ∆F ijt ≈ F ijt (1 − F ijt ) β 1 ∆s jt (see Hosmer and Lemeshow, 2000) . As a result, the impact depends positively on the FDI share a country initially holds, as long as the FDI share is smaller than 50%.
As shown in Table 2 Table 2 .
The results of the simulation analysis are presented in Table 3 . Note, almost all estimates are significant in the sense that zero is not included in the 1%-99% interval (***), and in the 5%-95% interval (**), respectively.
> Table 3 except for Ireland and Portugal, the decrease will not exceed 2%. Equation (1) Equation (2) Equation (3) Equation (4) Notes: Degrees of freedom in parentheses. *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%. 
